Introduction
Spanning 11 time zones and home to over 143 million people, the Russian Federation holds a prominent position on the world stage. It wields veto power on the UN Security Council, maintains one of the largest existing nuclear arsenals, and is one of the top three energy producers in the world. Indeed, recent world events have put Russia into the headlines so often that an introduction to the country seems almost superfluous. However, while many are familiar with the country itself, understanding the behavior of the Russian Federation is an entirely different matter.
Numerous experts and scholars have tried with varying success to make sense of the country, and scholars have often been both fascinated and frustrated in their attempts to explain and predict Russia's domestic and foreign policy behavior. Thus, this paper joins an already immense body of scholarship and literature in its efforts to try to understand the Russian
Federation. Yet while recognizing the extensive work that has already been completed, this paper will seek to create and advance new arguments by building on existing theories, and applying them to current events.
The topic of Russian energy policy is a subject of concern for many countries. Scholars such as Thane Gustafson and Marshall Goldman have written excellent, extensive works on the role energy has played in both holding Russia together, and in shaping its interactions with the rest of the world. However in this ever changing political and economic environment, with the Russian government struggling to overcome low oil prices, budget deficits, and external sanctions over actions in Ukraine, new scholarship is needed on the impacts of these events on Russia's foreign policy trajectory.
This paper will seek to show how Russia's continued stability as a state is directly tied to the rents associated with the Russian oil and gas industry, through a basic framework comprised of three main arguments. First, that Russian natural resources are not inherently a curse, and have been used in a beneficial way by the ownership structure in power, even during Soviet times, to drive technology and knowledge, and develop economic ties with other countries.
Second, and building off the previous statement, that Russia is a rentier state today, but it is the way in which those rents have been utilized that has defined the way the oil and gas industry has come to play a role in Russian foreign policy. Oil and gas rents are a double edged weapon, a tool, that if used correctly, has the potential to bring prosperity and growth to Russia.
However, the fact that these rents, and indeed, the broader oil and gas industries, have been used as a means of consolidating power and stability rather than growth and development, means that
Russia is moving towards a very different outcome. In other words, it is not natural resources but politics that is Russia's true curse.
This leads to the third point, which is that because Russia has utilized these rents towards consolidating power and security and not towards growth and development, they have actually undermined the very basis for the country's stability. Russia is beginning to experience, and will continue to experience, the opposite of what it wanted in using these resources to consolidate power, and there are signs that it is already being forced to act out of a position of insecurity and instability, especially in foreign policy.
Ultimately this framework suggests that as this short and medium term interdependence continues to be seen in the country's involvement in the evolving crises in Ukraine and in the Middle East, the long term political and economic consequences of these events will materialize through the shifting nature of Russia's relationship with countries such as China and Japan, further influencing the country's strategic decision to slowly pivot away from Europe and towards Asia.
Background
In 2012, disruptions in oil production in places like South Sudan, Yemen, Syria, and the North Sea resulted in upward pressure on the market and played a role in average crude oil prices rising to historically high levels for the second year in a row. Also in 2012, Vladimir Putin won Kudrin warned that while oil prices had risen dramatically from $70 to $100 in late 2011, this was not reflected proportionally in Russia's economic growth. Whereas before, oil at $60 5 dollars a barrel had generated 8% GDP growth, the nearly doubled price in oil was producing only half of that number in growth. According to Kudrin, this was due in part to weak 6 investment, with capital leaving Russia at a rate surpassing even that of the 1990s, but it was also a result of the increasing amount of oil revenues that were being taken by the government's ever expanding budget.
7
Russia was, in Kudrin's mind, on the path to greater deficits and instability due to the out of control spending, a path that would result in ever increasing dependence on the price of oil.
8
"If this year it takes oil at $115 a barrel to balance the budget," he predicted, "next year it will take about $122 a barrel." Yet the problem was even greater than this increased dependence on 9 oil prices. Despite the prices of the time, Kudrin warned that by 2014, oil prices could return to $60 a barrel, and the overall share of the oil and gas sector in the country's total GDP would shrink dramatically by 2020, resulting in a fiscal crisis for Russia.
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Kudrin's warnings fell largely on deaf ears, and his proposals for creating a stronger investment climate, and for ending the process of channeling investment through large state corporations, a process he saw as creating both corruption and capital flight, were ignored by the his campaign commitments would require oil prices to be at $150 per barrel or higher simply to balance the budget.
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Today, Russia's outlook at the end of 2015 looks considerably more grim than it did in 2012. The country's role in the Ukrainian conflict resulted in sanctions from the United States and Europe that put significant pressure on the economy. The decision of OPEC members to cut prices and continue with high levels of production, coupled with the increased production levels of the United States, proved even more devastating, pushing the country into the beginnings of a recession.
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Current Literature
Given this rapid series of events and the correspondingly dramatic change in circumstances, there is little doubt that Russia's oil and gas industry plays a significant part in the country's economy, and more broadly its power on the world stage. Many scholars have debated exactly what the nature of this relationship is, and what it means for Russia's future.
Most relevant to the purposes of this paper is the current discussion on the conceptualization of Russia as a rentier state.
In order to understand the literature, it is first important to define a rentier state. Luciani wrote that a rentier state can be identified when a government of any country receives at least 40% of its revenues in the form of rent. Beblawi writes more specifically that, "the rents come 15 from abroad, the rents accrue to the government directly, and only a few are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth,) the majority being only involved in the distribution or utilization as a rentier state is framed specifically in terms of natural resources, with rents generated not through aid or human activity, but through the scarcity value of resources such as oil and gas. becoming stronger," and "in a world of lowerpriced oil and gas, Russia, with its conventional energy signature and its declining legacy, would be squeezed between highercost production at home and lower prices for its oil and gas exports."
29
For Gustafson, there is a "mutual dependence of the oil industry and the state," wherein the "fortunes of oil have determined those of the state, while the strength or weakness of the state has shaped the fortunes of the oil industry." The country is akin to a house of cards, becoming 30 "more dependent than ever on exports of oil and gas and other natural resources, while failing to develop the sectors that might export highertech goods and services." Thus, when oil revenues 31 shrink, "Russia with its diminished human and physical capital, will be hardpressed to keep up with the emerging economies of Asia, as well as the mature knowledge economy of the United
States." Yet even while taking this more pessimistic view of Russia's oil and gas industry,
32
Gustafson nevertheless also believes that Russia's hope lies in this field, as the "fastest ticket to the hightech future," if industry reforms can be achieved that returns it "to its roots as a 28 In other words, both Goldman and Gustafson reject the traditional narrative of Russia as being wholly captured by a "resource curse," but neither of them deny that Russia truly is a "rentbased system" in which the flow of energy rents are so "vital to the maintenance of the economy and the political system," that it is not simply "at the heart of the system; it is the heart of the system." Though both men disagree in part about the implications of this system, they 34 both acknowledge that the "key to the fate of Russia is the fate of Russian oil," and that this interdependence has the potential to be both Russia's downfall and its salvation. Russia's present massive dependence was the implosion of the Soviet industrial system," and while "corruption has spread, budgetary discipline has loosened," and "reforms have been slowed down or frozen," it was not oil and gas that caused these problems. Rather, natural resources have "merely amplified" these already existing issues, meaning that "the impact of oil" primarily depends not on the oil itself but on "how you got it and what you do with it."
54
For both Högselius and Gustafson, "the story of the postSoviet industry is largely that of the battle for rents," and it was in this postSoviet environment that the primary changes in the way these rents were allocated began to shift. During the 1990s, these rents were claimed by 55 oligarchs and businesses, but by "the first decade of the 2000s, the state had succeeded in recapturing the lion's share" of these rents. In large part, this was due to the leadership and this development needed only a leader such as Putin to bring the institutional context necessary for transforming the rents of the oil and gas industry into a political weapon and foreign policy tool he could leverage in creating a strong and unchallenged presidency.
60
A number of scholars have spent a considerable amount of research on exactly how these energy rents have been used in this capacity. Many have begun by evaluating a thesis supposedly written by Putin early in his career, (though in actuality it may have been written by someone else under his name,) that seems to indicate oil and gas rents were already on the current president's mind long before now. In the paper, Putin argued that Russia's natural resources 61 should be a primary driver of the country's economic development and its international position, with state planning at the core of Russia's management of these resources.
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Several years into Putin's presidency, Martha Olcott, in collaboration with a number of other research partners conducted a study to discover if Putin had followed the strategy outlined control of these rents, "Russia's oil and gas reserves" had become "an attractive lever for use in Russia's foreign relations," and that Putin showed no indication that he was "willing to give up control of such lucrative and potentially authoritative instruments of power."
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The Brookings Institute then published a report a year later in 2006, which came to the conclusion that the "Russian economy depends not merely on exports, but on the total value of all oil and gas produced." In other words, Russia not only receives values from the price of 66 resources, but it also benefits from the excesses of that price, a sum otherwise known as windfall profit. Some of that windfall is retained by owners and a large majority is collected by the state 67 through taxes, duties, and fees, but there is also a large amount of the windfall that is distributed informally. (See Figure 1) 68 This is important, because as Gavin Wright writes in his article, there is a significant danger when a nation devotes too much effort to dividing up the bounty of the resource wealth, and not enough effort in creating the bounty, or ensuring the sustainability of the resource sector. rents has been so reduced from the previous levels of the past. Leon Aron expanded on this question, presenting in clear terms Russia's current dilemma. As he writes, the "dangerous political legacy of the Russian petrogas state is the centrality of oil and gas revenues," to "the loyalty of two groups that are essential for the regime's survival," namely "the lowerincome and elite segments" of society." As a result, "reducing dependence on oil and gas revenue" would 73 "mean sweeping and politically fraught reforms in welfare and pension systems," as well as expenditures," and an overhaul of "the taxation system," all of which would "erode the Kremlin's control over the economy, courts, and inevitably, politics."
74
Now, in the face of lower oil and gas revenues, Putin's choice not to implement such reforms "carries enormous social and political risks." As Aron notes, the impact of lower oil 75 and gas revenues is becoming especially evident on the "already very modest expenditures on health care and education," especially given the country's nearly "bankrupt state pension fund and a rapidly aging population." Moving forward, there is also the significant possibility that 76 these lower prices will also jeopardize the "regime's ability to subsidize the costs" of "soaring household utility prices."
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Even more concerning for internal stability however, is the potential loss of funds to regions like the North Caucasus, where subsidies from Russia amount to nearly 90% of the republic's budget, and help the current leader Ramzan Kadyrov in controlling a potentially volatile region filled with "lowintensity fundamentalist" uprisings, and "plagued by unemployment especially among young males."
78
Closer to Putin himself, the decline in rents could also result in the "Kremlin's declining ability to secure the elites' loyalty." If those within Putin's inner circle of elites feel they are 79 losing out on their share of the rents, there is a much greater chance that "squabbles" will erupt between them as they seek to "secure the same share of a diminishing pie," thereby "threatening They argue that "to the extent that economic growth is beginning to diminish and cynicism about the ability of the president to tackle domestic social and economic problems has increased,"
Putin's decision to focus on "a stronger projection of Russia's interests against perceived enemies abroad," is in fact "a logical response to head off a potential regime crisis."
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In evaluating a considerable amount of survey data, they find that "the assertive foreign policy" has "succeeded" in "stemming the fall in the president's popularity and given a shortterm boost to the system's legitimacy." However, they note that "it is a risky policy, and In other words, Putin has sought to promote security and stability through a consolidation of domestic power, and has sought to conserve the system rather than enact real reforms to the oil and gas industry. In terms of foreign policy, this has resulted in the oil and gas industries becoming largely a tool and a means of leverage for the state, rather than an industry that promotes growth, economic trade, and technological development for the country.
Unfortunately as a result of this leadership mindset, Russia has become increasingly dependent on the rents from these natural resources, a development that in turn, has undermined the very stability and national sovereignty Putin has sought to promote. Russia's transition to a rentier state, in which the rents are used to consolidate control and obtain political leverage, will not result in the independence and power he has sought on the international stage. Rather, his willingness to promote power consolidation at the expense of growth and development will leave the country even more vulnerable to instability, and eventually, the external pressures of other countries.
The Pivot to Asia
While many have focused on Russia's interference in Ukraine as a sign of Russia's emerging resurgence and aggression, less attention has been paid to the broader picture in which 90 ibid. 91 ibid.
this series of events demonstrates the depth of this underlying instability. Sergei Guriev, who although not altogether unbiased in matters regarding the Kremlin, spoke with considerable insight when he said that "having driven the economy into recession, the Russian elite has to find a new way to stay in power," and in trying to act out of this facade of stability and power, Putin "has spawned an aggressive foreign policy to which western leaders are now struggling to for over $10 billion in loans for the Yamal LNG project. This decision is in many ways a 105 direct result of current US sanctions, since Novatek has been unable to raise longterm loans from capital markets in US dollars, forcing it to turn to Chinese lenders to secure the necessary funding. In fact, not only has the Yamal project had to obtain the $10 billion mentioned by 106 Timchenko, but the project has so far failed to secure the remaining $15 billion that would be needed to launch operations.
107
In some respects, the difficulty obtaining funding is a reflection of the fact that the LNG market of today is quite different than when the project was first proposed by Russia. Projections
show that an LNG oversupply will continue until at least 2020, since new projects in Australia, the US and Mozambique are coming onstream and causing a supply glut. As a result, Russia's 108 continued push for the project shows a certain desperation, one that is not shared by China, and
shows just how few other options the country has given the plunge in oil prices and the cut in natural gas prices.
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On the one hand, Russia has increasingly become an energy supplier to China, replacing Saudi Arabia twice in 2015 as the biggest seller of crude to China, and at one point reaching a record 4.04 million metric tons or almost 988,000 barrels a day in September. These numbers 110 are 42% more than the year before, and have come largely, according to Gao Jian, an analyst at SCI International, as a result of Russia gaining "momentum with its pipeline and buying interest for its crude from teapot refineries." This growth from 2015 to 2014 is made even more 111 significant given that in 2014, imports had already skyrocketed by 36% since 2013, and Chinese imports from Saudi Arabia and Venezuela had already dropped by 8% and 11% respectively.
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Yet on the other hand, much of China's willingness to buy these near record amounts of crude is due to its decision to take advantage of a plunge in prices to boost stockpiles. So even though
113
Russia has in fact exported more crude to China, China has in some respects benefited more due to these advantageous prices.
Moreover, the major natural gas deal signed in May 2014 would see Russia exporting 38 billion cubic meters per year to China, beginning in 2018, with the possibility of ramping up those numbers to 60 bcm per year at some later point. Once again however, while this would 114 seem to be a deal in Russia's favor, both sides agreed on a price between $910 per million Btu, Cunningham, 2015. which was much closer to China's preferred price point, and though exact numbers were not disclosed, it is possible that China may have even secured a lower price than Europe pays for Russian gas.
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The effect of sanctions can also be seen elsewhere in the energy sector, as Russia seeks to find partnerships and investments outside of Europe and the United States. Recently, Rosneft suspended drilling in the Arctic Kara Sea in 2014, after U.S. ExxonMobil withdrew from the project during sanctions. As Russian oil companies have been cut off from both foreign 116 financial markets and drilling technologies, Russia has turned to China, and is currently in talks regarding issues like joint production of equipment for the energy industry in Russia. This patience has worked largely in China's favor. As Alexei Kokin, an analyst with Moscowbased bank Uralsib stated, "China is, of course, interested in getting control of resources but not at any price." Thus, as Sergei Tsyplakov, head of Sberbank OJSC's office in China, notes, "heads of agreements are multiplying at a furious pace," yet "practice shows that out of 10 agreements, we get one or at most two contracts." These agreements are nonbinding, 121 and tend to languish over time, despite the enthusiasm of the Kremlin. Putin himself has been effusive in discussing energy partnerships with China, even saying in 2014 that while, "we are generally very careful about giving access to our foreign partners," there are "no limitations for our Chinese friends." Yet even this speech, given during an invitation to the China National already owns 20%. In many cases, the kind of upstream equity stakes in these agreements were 125 something that had been opposed by Russia until recently, demonstrating again that Russia's overall economic and geopolitical position relative to China has weakened considerably.
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In fact, previous Russian reluctance went far beyond just upstream equity stakes. In 2002, for example, when Russian company Slavneft was put up for privatization, the Russian government refused to sell it to the China National Petroleum Company, even though they were the highest bidder. Now however, as Lee and Lukin note in their recent book, one can 127 "speculate" that Russia's pivot towards Asia was already in the works before the Ukrainian crisis.
After all, Russia's 2013 Foreign Policy Concept emphasized that "strengthening Russia's 128 presence in the AsiaPacific region" was "increasingly important" not only for boosting the "Far Eastern economy" but also for more general "cooperation on a collective basis." However,
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"Moscow's deteriorating political relations" with the West over the conflict have "almost certainly accelerated the eastward, mainly Sinocentric, drift of Russian economic policy," making the country much more amenable, and even eager for Chinese participation and investment in Russian energy industries. This is not to say that Russia has been looking only towards China as a potential partner in Asia. As Lee and Lukin write, "Japan looks like the most obvious option as a regional counterweight to China," and indeed "some prominent Russian analysts single it out as the most promising Pacific partner" by "suggesting it could become 'Russia's Germany in the East. '" 137 The reason for this is that, "faced with the postFukushima nuclear energy crisis, Japan has had to rely more on fossil fuels," thus "necessitating an increase in imports of oil and natural gas" from Russia. Moreover, from Russia's perspective, "Japan is the Asia Pacific country" that is 138 most concerned about "the rise of China," providing it with some incentive to "take steps that "gas resources are available," and that Russia is "ready to satisfy all Japan's gas demands on the account" of Russia's resources.
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Yet Russia's interactions with Japan are tainted by "the illfated dispute over the South Kurils and Northern territories," as well as a "stagnant Japanese economy," that makes Tokyo a "less attractive partner than it could have been," especially given that "energy consumption" in the country is "going flat and is not going to increase. doubt," the "growth" of Russia's "role in the Asian region" actually "contributes" to the country "raising" its "authority" in "other places as well, including in the West."
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The U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission took a more nuanced view, noting that "a simplistic view of the May 2014 deal is that Russia, under political and economic duress, final acquiesced to Chinese demands," when "in reality, the talks" actually "exacted compromises from both sides." The commission argued that the deal actually gave Russia a 152 good deal of leverage, and that "in the long run" European nations "could be affected by Russia's 'Asia pivot,'" for "with China now buying Russian gas supplies, Moscow could exert further pressure on Kiev, with less concern about upsetting its European clients." 
Analysis
In an exhaustively thorough 2015 report, the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies found that "the outlook for Chinese gas supply and demand balance remains very unclear on both sides of the equation," for "Chinese demand has slowed recently, with forecasts for 2020 being downgraded sharply," while at the same time "uncertainties" remain regarding "shale gas development." The authors conclude, "although the pivot to Asia can provide some 156 diversification for Russian gas exports over the longer term, it is unlikely to offer the strong insurance policy that Russia desires," and furthermore, "any threat to European supply that it theoretically implied is already being seen as relatively empty."
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If the pivot towards Asia, and more specifically China is, as the report indicates, less than a panacea for Russia's current troubles, then it seems unlikely that a deepening partnership with China would result in equal parity for both sides, and even more unlikely that such a relationship would result in any major revision in world order. However, the fact that Russia would sign such agreements even at a relative disadvantage, speaks volumes both about the role of energy rents in sustaining the state, and the relative position of weakness from which the country is currently forced to negotiate.
Russia certainly has not fallen so far that it is without any bargaining chips on the world 
Conclusion
Russia's world power status has seen a resurgence given its economic clout and wealth of natural resources. However, this renewed prominence is built on a fragile foundation that will ultimately prove to be unsustainable. A negotiated reading of Russia's status as a rentier state provides an understanding of just how precarious the country's current position remains, not because of the rents themselves, but because they are currently being used by Putin to consolidate control and maintain stability rather than to promote growth and economic development. As a number of scholars have noted, reforming how those rents are used could truly transform Russian society and place the country on a stable, level path towards regaining true power on the world stage. However, Putin is not willing to sacrifice his current foreign policy aims, built as they are on this unstable foundation, for the long term stability that such reforms would provide.
As a result, it is likely that Russia will continue down this path of instability, propped up by the oil and gas rents, until even those rents are no longer enough. As the recent deal with
China indicates, that day may be coming sooner than some might think. Already, there are strong indicators that Russia is beginning to operate out of a position of weakness, especially in relation to its shifting partnerships with the Asian countries. The major question moving forward then is not if this moment of collapse will come, but how the Russian leadership will respond when Russia's house of cards does finally fall.
The decision to pivot towards Asia is strategic not because of any immediate economic implications, but because of the quiet truth that underlies the current state of Russian foreign policy. Kudrin's warning showed remarkable foresight about the dangers of using Russia's oil Stivers 36
and gas industry to prop up such foreign policy aims, and his predictions continue to ring true. In using these rents to consolidate control and gain power for his foreign policy decisions, Putin has doomed Russia's future foreign policy to in turn be controlled by those rents, leaving the country with a lasting legacy of instability and weakness that will continue to affect both negotiations and the necessity of an Eastward pivot in the decades to come. 
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